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A Model-law Approach to
Restructuring Unsustainable
Sovereign Debt
Steven L. Schwarcz

Key Points
→→ Unresolved sovereign debt problems
are hurting debtor nations, their
citizens and their creditors, and also
can pose serious systemic threats to
the international financial system.
→→ The existing contractual restructuring
approach is insufficient to make
sovereign debt sustainable.
Although a more systematic
legal resolution framework is
needed, a formal multilateral
approach, such as a treaty, is not
currently politically viable.
→→ An informal model-law approach
should be legally, politically and
economically feasible. Individual
countries could enact the proposed
model law as their domestic law.
→→ Because most sovereign debt
contracts are governed by either
New York or English law, it would be
especially valuable if one or both of
those jurisdictions enacted a proposed
Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Model Law as their domestic law.

Introduction
Court decisions in the United Kingdom regarding the
illegality of exit consents, and in the United States regarding
pari passu clauses in Argentine sovereign debt, as well as
debt crises in Greece, Venezuela and other countries, have
dramatically highlighted the risks of an inadequate legal
resolution framework for restructuring unsustainable
sovereign debt. Unresolved sovereign debt problems are
hurting individual debtor nations and their citizens, as well
as their creditors. A sovereign debt default can also pose a
serious systemic threat to the international financial system.

The Contractual Approach
Is Inadequate
One of the main impediments is that the existing “contractual”
approach to sovereign debt restructuring — the use of socalled collective action clauses (CACs) — is insufficient to
solve the holdout problem. CACs are clauses in debt contracts
that enable a specified supermajority, such as two-thirds
or three-quarters, of the contracting parties to amend the
principal amount, interest rate, maturities and other critical
repayment terms. The holdout problem is a type of collective
action problem in which certain creditors, such as vulture
funds that may have bought debt in the secondary market
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at a deep discount, hope to receive full payment by
refusing to agree to a debt restructuring plan that
proposes to change critical terms, even though the
other debt holders consider the plan reasonable.
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For several reasons, CACs are insufficient to solve
the holdout problem. Many sovereign debt contracts
lack them, requiring unanimity to change critical
repayment terms — and thus enabling any party to
the contract to act as a holdout. For example, after
years of trying to include CACs, relatively few Greek
debt agreements actually contained such clauses and
those that did were generally restricted to bond issues.
Even in contracts that include CACs, the supermajority
requirement may be so high (for example, threequarters) that vulture funds are able to purchase voteblocking positions that enable them to act as holdouts.
Furthermore, a CAC ordinarily binds only the parties
to the particular contract that includes it. The parties to
any given sovereign debt contract, therefore, could act
as holdouts in a debt restructuring plan that requires
all of a debtor-state’s debt issues to agree to the plan.
CACs have been a step forward in some ways,
but they are not a substitute for pursuing a more
systematic legal resolution framework for helping
debtor-states to restructure unsustainable debt. In
the past, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
unsuccessfully proposed, and the General Assembly
of the United Nations has voted to pursue, a treaty
or convention that would govern sovereign debt
restructuring. The political economy of treaty making,
however, makes that type of multilateral approach
highly unlikely to succeed in the near future.

Advantages of a Modellaw Approach
A model-law approach to achieving a more
systematic legal resolution framework should be
legally, politically and economically feasible.
As explained in the Schwarcz Article,1 a model
law is suggested legislation for national (and
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An extended version of this paper contains a more detailed and
systematic analysis: Steven L Schwarcz, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
A Model-Law Approach” (2016) 6:2 J Globalization & Dev (Martin
Guzman, Domenico Lombardi, José Antonio Ocampo & Joseph Stiglitz,
eds) 343 [Schwarcz Article]. It is also available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2634653.
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sometimes subnational) governments to consider
enacting as domestic law in their jurisdictions.
Each government enacting a model law should
therefore take the steps necessary to make the
law effective in its jurisdiction. To facilitate crossborder legal comparability, each government
enacting a model law should, ideally, enact the
same legislative text. For that reason, model laws
are sometimes called uniform laws. The UNCITRAL
(United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law) Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration exemplifies a model law that has been
uniformly enacted in an international context; the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the United
States exemplifies a model law that has been
uniformly enacted in a subnational context.
The less formal process of developing and
enacting a model law can be politically appealing.
Indeed, adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration, an
area of law that had for many years struggled to
realize reform, may have been successful, in part,
due to its less formal structure as a model law. A
model-law approach would not require general
acceptance for its implementation. Nations and
even subnational jurisdictions could individually
enact a model law as their domestic law.
This is especially significant because most sovereign
debt contracts are governed by either New York
or English law. One or both of those jurisdictions
— in the case of New York law, a subnational
jurisdiction — could enact legislation based on a
model law. Thus, unlike the UCC, the initial goal for
a sovereign debt restructuring model law would be
enactment by only one or two jurisdictions. A model
law could also be pursued in parallel as part of an
overall strategy for developing a legal resolution
framework for sovereign debt restructuring.

A Proposed Model Law
The Schwarcz Article proposes a Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Model Law (see the Appendix). Among
other things, the proposed model law addresses the
holdout problem by legally mandating supermajority
voting that (assuming the requisite percentages
agree) can bind dissenting classes of claims. It also
enables a debtor-state to aggregate creditor voting
beyond individual contracts. Aggregate voting
is critical for at least two reasons: it can prevent

creditors of individual sovereign debt contracts
from acting as holdouts vis-à-vis other sovereign
debt contracts; and it allows a debtor-state to
designate large enough classes of claims to prevent
vulture funds (or similar holdouts), as a practical
matter, from purchasing enough claims to block a
restructuring plan or otherwise control the voting.
The proposed model law also addresses the critical
need for a financially troubled debtor-state to obtain
liquidity during its restructuring process. Although
this funding has in the past often been provided by
the IMF, the IMF may be unable, or unwilling, to
continue providing funding in the amounts needed.
Absent the IMF, whose loans have de facto priority,
no one would lend new money without obtaining
a priority repayment claim. Unless (as in the case of
Greece) virtually all of a debtor-state’s indebtedness
is held by a relatively small number of governmental
organizations, it would be impractical to get the
existing creditors to contractually subordinate
their claims to the new money. The model law,
however, gives such new-money lenders priority
over existing creditors, provided existing creditors
have notice and the opportunity to block the new
lending if its amount is too high or its terms are
inappropriate. (The model law does not, of course,
prevent a debtor-state from also, or alternatively,
obtaining such financing through a governmental
or multi-governmental source, such as the IMF.)
The model law contemplates a “neutral international
organization” as the law’s supervisory authority. It
is currently unclear what organization might qualify
as truly neutral; existing organizations such as the
IMF, the World Bank or a court of the debtor-state
may be considered too political or conflicted.
The very issue of the need for a supervisory authority
can also raise confusion. Formal sovereign debt
restructuring solutions, such as a treaty, are often
conflated with the need for formal supervisory
bodies. Under the proposed model law, however,
the supervisory authority lacks authority to
exercise discretion. All disputes are adjudicated
through binding arbitration. The main role of
the supervisory authority is administrative and
non-discretionary: to fact-check information
and to oversee the creditor voting process.
The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law’s
retroactivity might also raise a controversial legal
issue under domestic law, and US law in particular.
Retroactivity is essential for restructuring the
terms of existing sovereign debt contracts. Legal
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retroactivity is respected under international law
so long as it is neither discriminatory nor arbitrary.
The model law’s key operative provisions —
supermajority aggregate voting, and the granting
of priority to financiers of a debtor-state’s debt
restructuring — should be neither. US constitutional
law, however, would be relevant to interpreting
the retroactivity of supermajority aggregate
voting if New York State enacts the model law.
The “Contracts Clause” in Article I, Section 10 of
the US Constitution prohibits states (as opposed
to the federal government) from enacting any
legislation that impairs existing contractual
obligations. Nonetheless, the Schwarcz Article
concludes that New York State should be able
to frame its enactment of the model law in such
a way as to not violate the Contracts Clause.
In general, a state has leeway to retroactively
impair contracts if the impairment is reasonably
necessary to further an important public purpose
and also reasonable and appropriate to effectuate
that purpose. This leeway may be even greater if
the contractual impairment is not substantial.
New York State, therefore, could frame its enactment
of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law as
an exercise of its police powers to reduce sovereign
debt defaults that could lead to a systemic economic
collapse, thereby protecting economic activity
within its borders. The model law’s supermajority
aggregate voting and granting of priority to
financiers of a debtor-state’s debt restructuring
are appropriately tailored to reduce that threat.
Furthermore, any contractual impairment should
not be “substantial”; being limited to changes
that are voluntarily agreed to by a supermajority
of pari passu creditors based on the debtorstate’s deteriorating economic circumstances,
such changes — and hence the contractual
impairment — should reflect the economic reality
of what those creditors expect (under those
changed circumstances) to receive as payment.
A final question is whether the model law would be
economically and politically feasible. Some nations
may be concerned, for example, that enactment of
the model law would increase their borrowing costs
by making creditor claims more subject to
bail-in. Economists and other scholars have
recently argued and provided empirical evidence
to the contrary — that uncertainty due to the
absence of an effective sovereign debt resolution
framework actually increases the costs of
borrowing. However, even if the model law
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would increase borrowing costs, that increase
should not exceed the cost increase resulting from
workable CACs being included in all debt contracts,
which has been the ideal goal of the contractual
approach to sovereign debt restructuring.
The model law should also be politically feasible.
As mentioned, its less formal enactment process
can be appealing to debtor-states. The model law
would not require general acceptance by the world’s
nations for its implementation: only one or two
jurisdictions (New York State and/or England) need
enact the law for it to become widely effective.
Furthermore, the model law could be enacted with
total political neutrality through a “menu” option.
Rather than enacting the model law as its default
law governing sovereign debt restructuring, a
jurisdiction could enact the model law but provide
therein that sovereign debt contracts governed by
that jurisdiction’s law would only become governed
by the model law if the contract so specifies.
Article 1(1)(a) of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Model Law in the Appendix provides bracketed
alternative language to include such an option.
It is also informative to assess the model law’s
political feasibility from the perspective of the
politics of the IMF’s failed treaty approach. That
approach failed for several reasons. Certain emerging
market countries feared it would raise their cost of
borrowing. As mentioned, however, the model law
arguably should reduce or not affect that cost. At the
time the IMF proposed its treaty approach, many
believed that exchange offers could effectively amend
the terms of sovereign debt agreements to enable
supermajority voting. Experience, however, has long
since undermined that belief. Some also opposed the
IMF’s treaty approach because of suspicions about
the IMF’s conflicting role as both treaty sponsor and
supervisory authority thereunder. The model law,
in contrast, is not designed by the IMF, nor is the
IMF part of its supervisory process. Furthermore,
as indicated, the model law limits the supervisory
process to non-discretionary administrative
actions. Debtor-states should therefore want — and
creditors, other than rent-seeking holdouts, should
want them — to enact the proposed model law.
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relationship between a State and its
creditors and (b) the application of this Law
is invoked in accordance with Chapter II.

Recommendations
Interested debtor-states, as well as New York State
and England, should consider enacting the proposed
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law. Even if
that enactment doesn’t occur, however, this policy
brief and the Schwarcz Article on which it is based
provide a conceptual and legal analysis of how a
model law could be structured and how a model-law
approach could help nations to equitably restructure
unsustainable debt burdens. To that extent, they
should serve as incremental steps toward developing
norms for a sovereign debt restructuring legal
framework that goes beyond mere contracting.

Appendix
Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Model Law2
Preamble
The Purpose of this Law is to provide effective
mechanisms for restructuring unsustainable
sovereign debt so as to reduce (a) the social
costs of sovereign debt crises, (b) systemic risk
to the financial system, (c) creditor uncertainty,
and (d) the need for sovereign debt bailouts,
which are costly and create moral hazard.

(2) [This provision is optional] Where this Law
applies, it shall operate retroactively
and, without limiting the foregoing, shall
override any contractual provisions that are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Law.
Article 2: Use of Terms
For purposes of this Law:
(1)

“creditor” means a person or entity
that has a claim against a State;

(2) “claim” means a payment claim against
a State for monies borrowed or for the
State’s guarantee of, or other contingent
obligation on, monies borrowed; and the
term “monies borrowed” shall include the
following, whether or not it represents the
borrowing of money per se: monies owing
under bonds, debentures, notes, or similar
instruments; monies owing for the deferred
purchase price of property or services, other
than trade accounts payable arising in the
ordinary course of business; monies owing on
capitalized lease obligations; monies owing
on or with respect to letters of credit, bankers’
acceptances, or other extensions of credit; and
monies owing on money-market instruments
or instruments used to finance trade;

Chapter I: Scope, and Use of Terms

(3) “Plan” means a debt restructuring
plan contemplated by Chapter III;

Article 1: Scope

(4) “State” means a sovereign nation;

(1)

(5) “Supervisory Authority” means [name of
neutral international organization].

This Law applies where, by contract or
otherwise, (a) the law of [this jurisdiction3]
governs [alternative: this Law is specifically
stated to govern] the debtor-creditor

Chapter II: Invoking the Law’s Application
Article 3: Petition for Relief, and Recognition

2

3

In writing this model law, the author benefitted greatly from discussions
with colleagues on the International Insolvency Institute (III) Working
Group on Sovereign Insolvencies and the CIGI ILRP Working Group on
Cross-Border and Sovereign Insolvencies. Besides the author, the members
of these working groups are, respectively, Donald Bernstein, Zack
Clement, Allan Gropper, Robin Itkin, Steven T. Kargman, Kenneth N.
Klee, Christopher Klein, Bruce Leonard, Charles W. Mooney, Christoph
Paulus and Ignacio Tirado; and Mona Davies, Oonagh Fitzgerald, Mark
Jewett, Bruce Leonard, John Murray, Catherine Walsh and Miranda Xafa.
This would refer to a jurisdiction enacting this model law, for example,
New York, England, a nation, etc. Articles 3(3) and 12 further expand
this law’s application.

(1)

A State may invoke application of this
Law by filing a voluntary petition for
relief with the Supervisory Authority.

(2) Such petition shall certify that the State
(a) seeks relief under this Law, and has not
previously sought relief under this Law (or
under any other law that is substantially
in the form of this Law) during the past
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[ten] years, (b) needs relief under this Law
to restructure claims that, absent such
relief, would constitute unsustainable
debt of the State, (c) agrees to restructure
those claims in accordance with this Law,
(d) agrees to all other terms, conditions,
and provisions of this Law, and (e) has
duly enacted any national law needed to
effectuate these agreements. If requested by
the Supervisory Authority, such petition shall
also attach documents and legal opinions
evidencing compliance with clause (e).
(3) Immediately after such a petition for relief has
been filed, and so long as such filing has not
been dismissed by the Supervisory Authority
[or this jurisdiction] for lack of good faith,
the terms, conditions, and provisions of this
Law shall (a) apply to the debtor-creditor
relationship between the State and its creditors
to the extent such relationship is governed by
the law of [this jurisdiction]; (b) apply to the
debtor-creditor relationship between the State
and its creditors to the extent such relationship
is governed by the law of another jurisdiction
that has enacted law substantially in the form
of this Law; and (c) be recognized in, and
by, all other jurisdictions that have enacted
law substantially in the form of this Law.

Article 6: Contents of Plan
A Plan shall
(1)

(2) specify the proposed treatment
of each class of claims;
(3) provide the same treatment for each claim
of a particular class, unless the holder of a
claim agrees to a less favorable treatment;
(4) disclose any claims not included
in the Plan’s classes of claims;
(5) provide adequate means for the Plan’s
implementation including, with respect to
any claims, curing or waiving any defaults or
changing the maturity dates, principal amount,
interest rate, or other terms or cancelling or
modifying any liens or encumbrances; and
(6) certify that, if the Plan becomes effective
and binding on the State and its
creditors under Article 7(1), the State’s
debt will become sustainable.
Article 7: Voting on the Plan
(1)

Article 4: Notification of Creditors
(1)

Within 30 days after filing its petition
for relief, the State shall notify all of
its known creditors of its intention to
negotiate a Plan under this Law.

(2) The Supervisory Authority shall prepare
and maintain a current list of creditors of
the State and verify claims for purposes
of supervising voting under this Law.

Chapter III: Voting on a Debt
Restructuring Plan
Article 5: Submission of Plan
(1)

The State may submit a Plan to its
creditors at any time, and may submit
alternative Plans from time to time.

(2) No other person or entity may submit a Plan.

A Plan shall become effective and binding
on the State and its creditors when it has
been submitted by the State and agreed
to by each class of such creditors’ claims
designated in the Plan under Article 6(1).
Thereupon, the State shall be discharged
from all claims included in those classes of
claims, except as provided in the Plan.

(2) A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if
creditors holding at least [two-thirds]
in amount and more than [one-half]
in number of the claims of such class
[voting on such Plan4] [entitled to vote
on such Plan] agree to the Plan.
(3) Each class of claims shall consist of claims
against the State that are pari passu in priority,
provided that (a) pari passu claims need not
all be included in the same class, (b) claims
of governmental or multi-governmental
entities each shall be classed separately,

4

6

designate classes of claims in
accordance with Article 7(3);

The Plan can be more easily approved if this alternative is selected, but
reliable notice to creditors then becomes more important.
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and (c) claims that are governed by this
Law or the law of another jurisdiction that
is substantially in the form of this Law
shall not be classed with other claims.

Chapter V: Adjudication of Disputes
Article 10: Arbitration
(1)

Chapter IV: Financing the Restructuring
Article 8: Terms of Lending
(1)

Subject to Article 8(3), the State shall have
the right to borrow money on such terms
and conditions as it deems appropriate.

(2) The State shall notify all of its known
creditors of its intention to borrow under
Article 8(1), the terms and conditions of the
borrowing, and the proposed use of the loan
proceeds. Such notice shall also direct those
creditors to respond to the Supervisory
Authority within 30 days as to whether
they approve or disapprove of such loan.
(3) Any such loan must be approved by
creditors holding at least two-thirds
in amount of the claims of creditors
responding to the Supervisory Authority
within that 30-day period.
(4) In order for the priority of repayment
(and corresponding subordination) under
Article 9 to be effective, any such loan must
additionally be approved by creditors holding
at least two-thirds in principal amount of the
“covered” claims of creditors responding to
the Supervisory Authority within that 30day period. Claims shall be deemed to be
“covered” if they are governed by this Law
or by the law of another jurisdiction that
is substantially in the form of this Law.
Article 9: Priority of Repayment
(1)

All disputes arising under this Law
shall be resolved by binding arbitration
before a panel of three arbitrators.

(2) The arbitration shall be governed by [generally
accepted international arbitration rules of
(name of neutral international arbitration
body)] [the rules of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes/
International Centre for Dispute Resolution/
International Chamber of Commerce
International Court of Arbitration/ specify
other international arbitration organization].
(3) Notwithstanding Article 10(2), if all the parties
to an arbitration contractually agree that such
arbitration shall be governed by other rules,
it shall be so governed. Such agreement may
be made before or after the dispute arises.
(4) The State shall pay all costs, fees, and
expenses of the arbitrations.

Chapter VI: Opt In
Article 11: Opting in to this Law
(1)

Any creditors of the State whose claims
are not otherwise governed by this Law
may contractually opt in to this Law’s
terms, conditions, and provisions.

(2) The terms, conditions, and provisions of
this Law shall apply to the debtor-creditor
relationship between the State and creditors
opting in under Article 11(1) as if such
relationship were governed by the law of
[this jurisdiction] under Article 3(3).

The State shall repay loans approved under
Article 8 prior to paying any other claims.

(2) The claims of creditors of the State are
subordinated to the extent needed to
effectuate the priority payment under
this Article 9. Such claims are not
subordinated for any other purpose.
(3) The priority of repayment (and
corresponding subordination) under
this Article 9 is expressly subject to the
approval by creditors under Article 8(4).
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